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HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CASE: STATUTORY REVIEW OF
DISCRETIONARY POWER TO LICENSE
ROGER I. LEWIS
The recent case of Household Finance Co. v. State' involves judicial
review of a discretionary power to issue small loan licenses; but the
language used by the court is of such breadth that the entire field of
judicial review of administrative licensing must be re-examined. The
plaintiff (Household Finance Co.) desired to open small loan agencies
in Seattle and Vancouver. In compliance with statute, it made appli-
cation to the Supervisor of Banks for the necessary licenses, but the
application was denied. In accordance with statutory procedure,", the
superior court of Thurston County held a trial de novo. At the conclu-
sion of the hearing, the court decided that the only question on which
a decision could be rendered was whether the Supervisor had been
arbitrary and capricious in rejecting the application and sustained his
denial of the license. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court
held that the regulation of small loan agencies is a legislative exercise
of the police power. The statute confers discretionary power on the
Supervisor and it is within the limits of that discretionary power for
him to refuse licenses when he finds that the local demand for service
is insufficient. Therefore, review de novo of this function would be an
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the judiciary. When
the denial of a license is not arbitrary and capricious, the decision of
the Supervisor must stand.
The Household Finance case is the second decision involving the
Washington Uniform Small Loan Act.2 The issues dealt with by the
court concern § 43 which specifies the requirements which the licensee
must meet and § 234 which provides for appeal if the application is
denied. It is believed that the language used by the court in treating
these two sections of the act was broader than necessary to deal with
the points in issue, that the discretionary powers, of the Supervisor
under § 4 have been enlarged and made almost immune from intended
judicial review under § 23; and that if the language of the case is
1 40 Wn. 2d 451, 244 P. 2d 260 (1952).
la RCW Chap. 31.08 [REM. Supp. 1941 §§ 8371-1 to 8371-27].
2 The act was adopted in 1941 and upheld as constitutional in Kelleher v. Minshull,
11 Wn. 2d 380, 119 P. 2d 302 (1941).
3 RCW 31.08.050 [REM. Supp. 1941 § 8371-4].
4 RCW 31.08.260 [REM. Supp. 1941 § 8371-5].
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adhered to in the future, much of Washington administrative pro-
cedure will be altered.
Section 4 provides that the applicant shall pay certain fees, and have
certain assets, and that his -application shall be investigated by the
Supervisor of Banks to decide whether granting the license will pro-
mote the public "convenience and advantage." The plaintiff met all the
requirements which § 4 lays down in positive terms; but it did not
receive a license because the Supervisor, in the exercise of his discre-
tion, found that there was insufficient demand for small loan service
to justify the issuance of new licenses for Seattle and Vancouver.
The question of whether such administrative discretion is legislative
or judicial in nature becomes important where the statute (as in this
case) provides for an appeal. Quasi-legislative power gives the admin-
istrator in the capacity of a lawmaker authority to add to a statute;
and courts generally hold that judicial review of such action is in viola-
tion of the separation of powers concept." Quasi-judicial discretion, on
the other hand, is interpretative rather than creative and the courts are
willing to apply statutory appeal provisions."
Whether the Supervisor's power was to be legislative* or judicial is
not clearly disclosed by the words "convenience and advantage." If
"convenience and advantage" was meant to delegate the power to add
clarity and detail to the statute when the need arose, then it would be
beyond the power of the court to set aside such additions unless they
were arbitrary and capricious. On the otier hand, if the legislature
meant to establish a permanent standard or rule and yet was unable
to express more clearly the details of this standard, then "convenience
and advantage" would be a statutory command binding the Supervisor
under the interpretation of the court.
Since the court declined to make its own findings as to whether
granting the licenses would have benefited the public "convenience and
advantage," the Supervisor's- discretion is quasi-legislative; but if this
is so, it is subject to rebuttal by way of the normal rules of statutory
construction. In interpreting statutes, the statute is to be considered
as a whole and no individual clause should be given any special weight
which would put it out of context with the rest of the act." Since "con-
s Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
6 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Co., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) which
holds that quasi-legislative authority of a tribunal cannot be reviewed, but quasi-
judicial determinations are subject to review and reversal for any mistake of law.
7 Bradley Engineering and Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170
(1910).
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venience and advantage" is not clearly defined in the statute, there is
nothing in the words themselves which dictates that they should vest
one type of discretion rather than the other. With the interpretive
possibilities evenly matched, the rule is that the interpretation given
a section shall be that which makes it most clearly compatible with
the rest of the act." The remainder of the act in this case includes § 23
which gives an aggrieved applicant the right to a trial de novo. Since
it would require a finding that "convenience and advantage" creates
a set standard in order to make administrative findings thereunder
reviewable and since the legislature has made the law, it would seem
that § 23 dictates that § 4 creates a quasi-judicial discretion. How-
ever, the holding of the case was to the contrary.
Since the words "convenience and advantage" are part of the
statute, the court was bound to make a determination of some kind;
and in disposing of this problem, the court chose to adopt the Super-
visor's interpretation. His determination of "convenience and ad-
vantage," then, became the law.
The Supervisor was greatly concerned with the significance of nu-
merical limitation of small loan licenses. In referring to the findings
of the Supervisor, the court expressed the view that controlling com-
petition was an essential part of what constitutes "convenience and
advantage"; and the concurring opinion of Judge Finley emphasized
controlled competition as a mode of police regulation. No doubt there
is merit in this concept, for it appears in the history of small lending
that unrestricted competition did not, in and of itself, produce the
lowest rates and best conditions via supply and demand. Perhaps
some numerical limitation would be one good attack on the problem;
but there is no express authorization of numerical limitation in the
statute. Despite this fact, the court makes no mention of other factors
which might be considered. If numerical limitation is the sole touch-
stone and it is beyond the power of the ;ourt to examine the factors
which the Supervisor considers, then the Supervisor has the discretion
to establish and maintain a mathematical status quo. Indeed this case
would support that interpretation because there were two applications
in issue: one for Seattle and one for Vancouver; and it appears that
there were differences of business conditions with respect to supply
and demand. The court makes reference to the differences in general
business conditions which the appellant had urged by saying that the
8 Rothweiler v. Winton Motor Car Co., 92 Wash. 215, 158 Pac. 737 (1916).
9 See Shattuck, Regulation of Small Loan Companies, 16 WAsH. L. R. 117 (1941).
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Supervisor's decision could be justified in both cases. The affirmance
of the Supervisor is categorical and therefore there is a strong inference
that controlled competition was the sole factor considered.
It is open to question whether any one person should be vested with
the power to impose an absolute numerical limitation unless the busi-
ness involved was truly dangerous to the community. It is likewise
open to question whether the interpretation given supports the ob-
jectives of the legislature. If the legislature felt the need of numerical
limitation as a controlling standard, the statute should say so. How-
ever, it does not; and in Keleher v. Minshull,"- the court held that
numerical limitation was not the sole desideratum intended by the
legislature. If numerical limitation was not the sole factor to be con-
sidered, then the Supervisor's interpretation makes a de facto change
in the statute. A change in a statute by an administrative officer is
legislation and is in violation of the same doctrine of separation of
powers which the court so vigorously sought to protect in refusing to
review the Supervisor's action."
Judge Hamley's dissent, in the instant case, was predicated on the
belief that controlled competition was not the determining factor. He
contends rather that § 4 was intended to eliminate undesirables in the
first instance and to make sure that those who are licensed are
reputable establishments. The dissent contends that there is effective
control vested in the Supervisor by way of the elaborate system of
accountings and reports which are required of the licensed lender by
§§ 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 17.11
The statute did provide protection against sharp practices in posi-
tive terms.1 2 Furthermore, the act was designed primarily to protect
the borrower; and it is submitted that if the administrative officer
enforces these provisions, it is difficult to see how the public'at large
is to suffer if any particular agency is faced with able competition. On
the other hand, it takes no large amount of conjecture to appreciate
the moral suasion which a monopolistic agency has over the borrower
who needs cash money immediately and has neither time nor means
to seek out a lender in another city.
9a 11 Wn. 2d 380, 119 P. 2d 302 (1941).
10OUhden Inc. v. Grennough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P. 2d 983 (1935).
11 § 3, RCW 31.08.030 [REm. Supp. 1941 § 8371-3]; § 7, RCW 31.08.080 [RE.
Supp. 1941 § 8371-7]; § 8, RCW 31.08.090 [RP=. Supp. 1941 § 8371-8]; § 9, RCW
31.08.100, 110, 120 [REzm. Supp. 1941 § 8371-9]; § 10, RGW 31.08.130 [Rzm. Suwp.
1941 §8371-10]; § 11, RCW 31.08.140 [Rnm. Supp. 1941 § 8371-11]; § 17, RCW
31.08.200 [REM. Supp. 1941 § 8371-17].
12 § 13, RCW 31.08.160 [REm. Supp. 1941 § 8371-13], for example, prohibits the
practice of "loan splitting."
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As to the trial de novo provision in § 23, the court states that the
legislature can control small loan businesses because their rates are
usurious and hence their very existence must be justified on the basis
of legislative enactment for the public need. On this basis, the court
held the de novo provision unconstitutional because trial de novo, as
it is used in the act, means a new trial of the law and facts to determine
whether the applicant shall have a license.13 Furthermore, a court
cannot issue the license because this is an administrative duty and the
court will not take executive power upon itself.
There may be sound basis for the court's contention that it cannot
justifiably issue a license in its own right, but is there anything in-
herent in the nature of the determination which makes its review un-
constitutional simply because it involves administrative action? In
past cases, the court has held that it must review questions of law;"'
and in order to review questions of law a complete review of the facts
may be necessary. Instances of de novo review of administrative action
occur where constitutional guarantees are in issue. Courts review rate
making cases to determine whether a rate is confiscatory even though
the court could not establish the rate itself. 5 Likewise, a court can
review the facts of a case involving a certificate of convenience and
necessity to determine the issue of equal protection of the laws even
though it could not issue the certificate." Furthermore, de novo review
may be had where the administrative functions in question are merely
ministerial such as those performed by county boards of health and
municipal business licensors. The court will review the facts de novo
in deciding whether injunction or mandamus" will lie to compel the
tribunal to perform a ministerial duty which the court would not
perform itself. Thus in many cases, courts not only can but must
conduct a trial de novo though the action to be taken in the case could
not be taken by the court itself."
It would appear, therefore, that the categorical refusal of the court
to review facts which involve administrative determinations applies
only when there are no constitutional or ministerial questions involved,
13 The following statement of the trial court was adopted, ". . . trial de novo means
a new and independent trial on the law and facts to determine whether a license shall
be granted. .. ."
14 In re Employees of Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32 Wn. 2d 205, 201 P. 2d 194
(1948).
15 State v. Department of Public Service, 19 Wn. 2d 200, 142 P. 2d 498 (1943).
16 Miller v. Tarry, 191 S.W. 2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
17 Security Savings Society v. Spokane County, 111 Wash. 35, 189 Pac. 260 (1920).
18 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Hill, 135 Wash. 442, 237 Pac. 1004 (1925).
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and that perhaps the court is merely saying that the Supervisor is
within his discretionary powers in limiting the number of licenses in
accordance with the demand as that demand is found by him. Question
arises then, as to whether the exercise of discretionary power to
license can be reviewed when the statute provides for it.
In some cases, courts have had an aversion to factual reviews where
the issues involve scientific or technical data which require the special
skills of the administrator for proper analysis." But the Washington
court, in prior cases, has held that technicality and complication are
not deterrents "to judicial review of the facts and has expressed a
willingness to follow the legislative directive where trial de novo is
provided. And so in In re Littlefield,"0 the court directed an examining
board to issue a physician's license after holding a trial de novo as
provided by statute. The appellant contended that the court should not
review a fact pattern which involves medical matters but the court
answered that technicality is no bar when the intent of the legislature
is clear in providing trial de novo. The court held that matters of
medical detail are well within the court's power of review and cites its
findings on criminal insanity as an example. To the same effect is
Russel v. Dibble2 where the Washington court, in denying mandamus
for a medical license because it found the de novo provision adequate,
stated that statutory provisions for appeal de novo should be liberally
construed.
Another possible explanation of why the court would not review the
discretionary acts of the Supervisor is the judicial aversion against
encroaching on the police power. This seems to be the reason empha-
sized by the majority. In general, the legislature has a rather clearly
defined power to regulate or even prohibit certain activities which are
deemed detrimental for some reason or another. 2 The court in the
instant decision finds that his power can put administrative action
above judicial review for all but arbitrary and capricious misconduct.
It is true that the legislature may expressly prohibit an activity or
allow it under closely controlled conditions. If that activity is then
allowed under license, the opportunity to engage is a privilege, not a
right. With no right to engage, the applicant has no right which the
court can protect, and hence the court cannot properly order the
19 California Co. v. State Oil & Gas Board, 200 Miss. 284, 27 So. 2d 542 (1946).
20 61 Wash. 150, 112 Pac. 234 (1910).
21132 Wash. 51, 231 Pac. 18 (1924).22 Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. 1043 (1928).
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license issued.3
If the small loan business is an endeavor that exists at the pleasure
of the legislature, where did that status come from? There is nothing
inherently wrong with lending money. A particular small loan agency
may constitute a public nuisance, but this would stem from the par-
ticular practices involved and not from small lending per se." Common
law usury has always been an objectionable factor in business prac-
tices, but as was stated in Acme Finance Company v. Huse, 5 there
is no necessary connection between small lending as a business and
the illegality of usury. Usury is no more lawful in large loan contracts
than it is in small ones.
The Uniform Small Loan Act, as promulgated by the Russel Sage
Foundation, provided statutory appeal only for those cases where the
Supervisor was arbitrary and capricious;" but the Washington legis-
lature saw fit to provide a de novo review subject to no special quali-
fication. Granting that the court cannot issue a license, does it not
seem (in view of the fact that the legislature is bound to know this)
that trial de novo is an expression of legislative desire for the court to
have some control of the Supervisor and as a result, the statutory
words of discretion are more a matter of law so that the court is to
have some say in deciding whether a license shall issue? In Kelleker
v. Minshull, the appellant contended that the statute was illegal
because it subjected the small loan business to arbitrary regulation;
but the court answered by saying that the power of the Supervisor is
limited by the trial de novo provision.
As a result of this case, new applicants for small loan licenses may
be denied a hearing entirely. The Supervisor may wish to grant a
hearing at the administrative level, but there is no compulsory provi-
sion which the applicant can invoke. Since the Supervisor, in determin-
ing "convenience and advantage" must make findings of fact, the
applicant should have a right to submit testimony and evidence; and
he should have a right to urge his side of the bargain." This is the
sum and substance of his procedural right to a day in court.28 There is
still an appeal provision, but it can only be invoked to show arbitrary
and capricious misconduct. It does not give the applicant a right to
2
3 Ibid.
214 State v. O'Neil, 205 Minn. 366, 286 N.W. 316 (1939).
25 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. 2d 341 (1937).
26 F. B. Hubacheck, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAWS (1938).
27 Mott v. State, 148 Ga. 55, 95 S.E. 867 (1918).
28 See Deutsch v. Department of Insurance, 397 Ill. 218, 73 N.E. 2d 304 (1947).
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urge his side of the case on the merits. According to the Kelleher case
and the de novo provision, the legislature has not exercised its power
to make small lending a mere privilege; and as a general proposition,
a man who has any rights which stand to be altered or lessened by
governmental action has a right to a hearing so that he can present the
facts as he sees them." With these general premises, it is urged that
the applicant is denied his rights to procedural due. process of law, or
at least the procedural rights intended by the legislature. If the court
was bound to invalidate the de novo provision, then should it not have
followed the Acme Finance case and declared the entire Uniform
Small Loan Act unconstitutional?
With the denial of a right to be heard either before the tribunal or a
court in the alternative, the instant case may produce ramifications
which go beyond small lending. If one cannot urge the tribunal to find
his application as meritorious, and if the court cannot review the deci-
sion and hear the applicant because this is in fact an administrative
duty, then cannot the hearing be denied whether the applicant asks
for a license as a doctor, dentist, chiropractic or small lender? Will
not this decision apply to all occupations which are subject to admin-
istrative licensing? It appears that twenty-seven licensed occupations
are covered by statutes with de novo appeal provisions. 0 Some of them
20 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1919).
30 (1) Dairy Products. RCW 15.36.580 [Ram. Sup. 1949 § 6266-46b].
(2) Sale of Securities. RCW 21.04.180 [RRS § 5853-16].(3) Mining Securities: Dealers. RCW 21.08.120.
(4) Gas, Oil & Mining Leases. RCW Chap. 21.12 [RRS § 5853].
(5 Savings & Loan Associations. RCW 33.04.060 [REM. Supp. 1945 § 3717-234].(6) Macaroni Products: Producers. RCW 69.16.080, 090 [RRS § 6294-112, 113].(7) Puget Sound Pilots. RCW 88.16.100 [RRS § 9871-13].
(8 Accountancy. RCW 18.04.260, 320 [Ram. Supp. 1949 § 8269-32-38].(9 Architects. RCW 18.08.050 [RRS § 8271].
(10 Barbers. RCW 18.15.050.
(11) Beauty Culture. RCW 18.18.110 [RRS § 8278-12].(12) Chiropody. RCW 18.22.170 [RRS § 10088].
(13) Chiropractics. RCW 18.25.050 [RRS § 10103].
(14) Dental Hygienists. RCW Chap. 18.29 [RRS § 10030-26 et Seq.].
(15) Dentistry. RCW 18.30240 [RRS § 10031-9].(16) Drugless Healers. RCW 18.36.170, 320 [RRS § 10125-1, -6].(17) Midwifery. RCW 18.50.110 [RRS § 10180].
(18) Optometry. RCW 18.53.080 [RRS § 10150].
(19) Osteopathy. RCW 18.57.200 [RRS § 10052].
(20) Pharmacy. RCW 18.64.170, 200 [RRS §§ 10143, 10144].(21) Physicians and Surgeons. RCW 18.71.140 [RRS § 10014].
(22) Physical Therapy. RCW Chap. 18.74 ERRS § 10163].
(23) Practical Nurses RCW 18.78.140 [REm. Supp. 1949 § 10173-4].
(24) Real Estate Brokers. RCW 18.85.251; RCW 18.85.271.
(25) Maternity Homes. RCW 18.46.050; RCW 18.46.100.
(26) Registered Nurses. RCW 18.88.240 [Ram. Supp. 1949 § 10173-22].
(27) Veterinarians. RCW 18.92.210 [REm. Supp. 1941 § 10040-15].
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provide for de novo review expressly," others spell out de novo in one
form or another.82
Of the twenty-seven statutes, ten contain some words of discretion
which vest the administrator with something more than ministerial
power.8 The most common example is the requirement of "good moral
character" which is found in many of the personal service occupation
groups." In view of the court's treatment of the statutory words "con-
venience and advantage" and in view of the fact that the minimum
moral character required is as tenuous to define as is a state of public
benefit or advantage, these statutes are surely affected by the House-
hold Finance case.
Among these statutes, there may well be a variance of treatment in
future cases which is predicated on the status of the occupation as a
matter of right. Perhaps one still has more of a right to be a doctor
than a small lender, but it should be noted that provision for trial de
novo of the applicant's case will not, of itself, make the court aware
of a legislative intent that an occupation be more than a mere privilege.
Some sixteen statutes provide for a hearing before the administrator
and a review de novo.85 If the Washington court follows the rule as
stated in the instant case, these de novo provisions may become uncon-
stitutional and nothing but the administrative hearing will remain as
an equivalent to a day in court. Such an administrative hearing may
be sufficient; but provision for a court rehearing of the facts is so
common in Washington's occupational statutes as to indicate an unmis-
takable pattern of legislation. The validity of that pattern is now in
serious doubt.
Of even greater consequence is the effect of the instant decision on
those statutes where no hearing at the administrative level is provided.
There are, including the Small Loan Act, twelve statutes which direct
that the licensee's sole chance to present his case shall be before a
(28) Note that in all of the sections covered by RCW Title 18 (except Veteri-
narians) where there is only one section of the Revised Code noted, that
section provides only for a hearing at the administrative level. However,
these sections are among the "trial de novo group" because those licenses
are issued by the Director of Licenses; and that office is subject to review
de novo for refusal to issue licenses. See RCW 43.24.120 [RRS § 10864].
81 See Puget Sound Pilots, note 30 (7) supra.
82 RCW 43.24.120 [RRS § 10864].
88 Note 30, supra, (6), (7), (13), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), and (22).
84 See Chiropractics, Drugless Healers, Optometrists, and Osteopaths note 30.
supra, (13), (16), (18), and (19).85Note 30, supra, (1), (2), (7), (8), (10), (11), (13), (15), (17), (18), (19),
and (20).
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superior court on de novo review."6 Of these statutes, at least four
contain words of administrative discretion."7 If these de novo provi-
sions are illegal then is it not reasonable to contend that all twelve
statutes are unconstitutional for lack of a hearing on the merits? At
the very minimum, it is suggested that this is an incongrous situation
and certainly calls for legislative revision of some kind. If the legisla-
ture cannot legally specify a trial de novo, then some lesser kind of
provision for a hearing should be provided such as an administrative
trial which the applicant can demand as a matter of right.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the court has sanctioned an
interpretation of "convenience and advantage" which is based on lim-
iting competition. The Supervisor will be sustained in keeping out new
potential lenders unless he oversteps the hazy bounds of arbitrary and
capricious misconduct. In view of the fact that no hearing is required,
the powers of the Supervisor become very broad indeed. It is not at all
beyond the realm of possibility that the time will come when the rela-
tionship between the administrator and the then long existing agencies
will be entirely too cordial to promote the public convenience and
advantage and in that state of affairs, the question arises as to the
advisability of controlled competition as the equivalent of "conveni-
ence and advantage," i.e. to what advantage and to whose convenience?
8e Note 30, supra, (3), (4), (5), (6), (9), (12), (14), (16), (22), (23), (27).3?Note 30, supra, (6), (16), (22), and (26).
